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COMMENTS
EXCESS INSURER'S DUTY TO DEFEND AFTER
PRIMARY INSURER SETTLES WITHIN
POLICY LIMITS: WISCONSIN AFTER
LO Y AND TEIGEN
INTRODUCTION
Excess insurance is a policy covering the insured against
certain hazards applying to loss or damage in excess of a
stated amount. Its purpose is "to protect the insured in the
event of a genuinely catastrophic loss. ' '1 The risk of initial
loss or damage may be carried by the insured, or by another
policy known as primary protection. The primary insurer
bears the initial burden of defending the lawsuit. An excess
insurer's duty to defend normally arises after the primary in-
surer's policy limit has been exhausted.
There is a lack of uniformity among decisions regarding
the obligation to defend and the allocation of defense costs
between primary and excess insurance carriers. 2 The Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court considered the relationship between pri-
mary and excess insurers in Loy v. Bunderson 3 and Teigen v.
Jelco of Wisconsin, Inc.' These cases are unique from others
in that the primary insurers settled for amounts within their
policy limits, while the insureds reserved their claims against
the excess insurers.
This Comment focuses on "true" excess insurers, though
reference is made to "coincidental" excess insurers. As a pre-
liminary matter, a distinction must be made between excess
insurers whose policy limits do not ordinarily come into play
1. Gallagher & German, Resolution of Settlement Conflicts Among Insureds, Pri-
mary Insurers, and Excess Insurers: Analysis of the Current State of the Law and Sug-
gested Guidelines for the Future, 61 NEB. L. Rnv. 284, 352 (1982) [hereinafter
Gallagher & German, Settlement Conflicts].
2. Compare Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, 56 Cal.
App. 3d 791, 805-08, 129 Cal. Rptr. 47, 56-57 (1976), with Travelers Ins. Co. v. Ameri-
can Fidelity & Casualty Co., 164 F. Supp. 393, 402 (D. Minn. 1958).
3. 107 Wis. 2d 400, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982).
4. 124 Wis. 2d 1, 367 N.W.2d 806 (1985).
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until the primary insurers' limits are exceeded, otherwise
known as "true" excess or excess "by design," and secondary
insurers whose limits are excess only because of the policy
provisions, otherwise known as "unintended" or "coinci-
dence" coverage arising from "other insurance" clauses in the
policies.5 In "true" excess situations, as with cases involving
only one primary insurer, the initial focus is on the language
of the various policies involved, since the language is much
more likely to be tailored to meet the needs of the insured.
The "true" excess policy is a separate policy written only with
the excess liability situation in mind. An "umbrella" policy is
the most common form of "true" excess insurance, insuring
against more types of risks than are covered by the insured's
primary policy. The vast majority of "coincidence" cover-
ages, in contrast, are merely form policies. The "coincidence"
policy is simply a primary policy with the same duty to defend
obligations as if there were no excess coverage problem
presented.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that different types of excess
coverage exist, courts often ignore the distinctions between the
various forms. For purposes of this Comment, unless other-
wise noted, the term "excess" will be used to connote the
"true" excess situation.
This Comment reviews in Part I the general nature of the
duty to defend. Part II discusses the obligations the primary
insurer and excess insurer owe to their insured. Part III fo-
cuses upon whether any obligation runs from the primary in-
surer to the excess insurer. It demonstrates that a relationship
does exist between the two companies. Part IV then summa-
rizes the current law in Wisconsin on the issue of whether an
excess insurer must defend the insured after the primary in-
surer has settled out of the action for an amount within the
primary policy limits. Part V compares the various ap-
5. See P. MAGARICK, ExcEss LIABILITY 19 (2d ed. 1982); Alleman, Resolving the
"Other Insurance" Dilemma: Ordering Disputes Among Primary and Excess Policies, 30
KAN. L. REv. 75 (1981-82); German & Gallagher, Allocation of the Duties of Defense
Between Carriers Providing Coverage to the Same Insured, 47 INS. COUNS. J. 224 (1980)
[hereinafter German & Gallagher, Duties of Defense]; Comment, Liability of Excess and
Primary Automobile Insurance Companies for Defense Costs, 52 MARQ. L. REv. 367
(1968-69).
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proaches to the issue and suggests that an excess insurer
should not be forced to defend the insured in such a situation.
I. THE DuTY OF DEFENSE
In deciding whether any insurance company is obligated
to defend its insured, the insurance policy provisions must be
examined to determine whether the allegations fall within cov-
erage.6 Generally speaking, the allegations in the complaint
determine the duty to defend.7 The duty arises if policy cover-
age "is merely alleged or if it appears that there may be cover-
age, even though subsequent developments and the evidence
prove that there was, in fact, no actual coverage"' under the
policy. In Grieb v. Citizens Casualty Co., 9 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court stated:
It is the nature of the claim alleged against the insured
which is controlling even though the suit may be groundless,
false or fraudulent .... Conversely stated, "the insurer is
under an obligation to defend only if it could be held bound
to indemnify the insured, assuming that the injured person
6. For a thorough discussion on the duty to defend in general, see Sharpe & Shaffer,
The Parameters of an Insurer's Duty to Defend, 19 FORUM 555 (1983-84).
7. See P. MAGARICK, supra note 5, at 25 n.1.
8. Id. at 10; 7C J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4682, at 20-21
(1979). The duty to defend continues even if there are allegations in the complaint that
are outside of the coverage. See, eg., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 603 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1979); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Louis A.
Roser Co., 585 F.2d 932 (8th Cir. 1978); Oliver B. Cannon & Son v. Fidelity & Casualty
Co., 484 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Del. 1980); C. Raymond Davis & Sons v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 467 F. Supp. 17 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Steyer v. Westvaco Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384 (D.
Md. 1978); Tropical Park, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 357 So. 2d 253
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Lerner v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 245 S.E.2d 249 (Va.
1978). Often, however, the duty is based solely on the allegations of the complaint and
not on outside facts. See, eg., Klaesen Bros. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 611 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Illinois Casualty Co. v. Turpen, 84 Ill. App. 3d 288, 405 N.E.2d 4
(1980); American Policyholders' Ins. Co. v. Cumberland Cold Storage Co., 373 A.2d
247 (Me. 1977); Dochod v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 81 Mich. App. 63, 264 N.W.2d 122
(1978); Applegren v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 268 N.W.2d 114 (N.D. 1978); Flori v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 120 R.I. 511, 388 A.2d 25 (1978). Contra Texaco, Inc. v. Hartford
Accident and Indem. Co., 453 F. Supp. 1109 (E.D. Okla. 1978); C.A. Fielland, Inc. v.
Fidelity & Casualty Co., 297 So. 2d 122 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Lanoue v. Fireman's
Fund Am. Ins. Cos., 278 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. 1979).
9. 33 Wis. 2d 552, 148 N.W.2d 103 (1967).
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proved the allegations of the complaint, regardless of the ac-
tual outcome of the case." 10
The duty of an insurer to provide a defense for claims as-
serted against its insured is contractual in nature. Courts ex-
amine policy language to determine defense obligations." The
duty to defend provision of any insurance policy is an agree-
ment by which the insurer, in consideration of a premium
paid by the insured, assumes the obligation to arrange for and
pay the expenses of certain lawsuits brought against the
insured. 12
An insurer owes a duty of good faith and fair dealing1 3 to
the insured and, more particularly, a duty of due care in de-
10. Id. at 558, 148 N.W.2d at 106 (citing 29A AM. JUR. Insurance § 1452, at 565
(1960)); see Sola Basic Indus. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 90 Wis. 2d 641, 280
N.W.2d 211 (1979); Gerrard Realty Corp. v. American States ins. Co., 89 Wis. 2d 130,
277 N.W.2d 863 (1979); see also 7C J. APPLEMAN, supra note 8, at 16 (insurer bound to
defend insured against suits alleging facts and circumstances covered by the policy, even
though such suits are groundless, false or fraudulent).
11. The majority of states do not require an insurer to defend unless the obligation
is expressed in the terms of the policy. See, e.g., Previews, Inc. v. California Union Ins.
Co., 640 F.2d 1026 (9th Cir. 1981); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
536 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1976); Healy Tibbitts Constr. Co. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 482 F.
Supp. 830 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Mattocks v. Daylin, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 512 (W.D. Pa.
1978), aff'd, 614 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1979); Haines v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
428 F. Supp. 435 (D. Md. 1977); All-Star Ins. Corp. v. Steel Bar, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 160
(N.D. Ind. 1971); Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr.
104 (1966); Brown Mfg. Co. v. Crouse, 251 Iowa 594, 102 N.W.2d 154 (1960); Ruder &
Finn, Inc. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 52 N.Y.2d 663, 422 N.E.2d 518, 439 N.Y.S.2d 858
(1981); Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Rhoades, 405 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966);
Stanhope v. Brown County, 90 Wis. 2d 823, 280 N.W.2d 711 (1979); RTE Corp. v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 74 Wis. 2d 614, 247 N.W.2d 171 (1976).
12. C. Raymond Davis, 467 F. Supp. 17; Kincaid v. Simmons, 66 A.D.2d 428, 414
N.Y.S.2d 407 (1979).
13. In every policy of insurance, there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing by which each party agrees to refrain from preventing the other from receiving
the benefits of the agreement. See, e.g., Chavers v. National Sec. Fire & Casualty Co.,
405 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 1981); Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1979); Noble v. National
Am. Life Ins. Co., 128 Ariz. 188, 624 P.2d 866 (1981); Grand Sheet Metal Prods. Co. v.
Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Conn. Supp. 46, 375 A.2d 428 (1977); Farmers Ins. Exch.
v. Schropp, 222 Kan. 612, 567 P.2d 1359 (1977); Corwin Chrysler-Plymouth v. West-
chester Fire Ins. Co., 279 N.W.2d 638 (N.D. 1979); Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 6
Ohio St. 3d 272, 452 N.E.2d 1315 (1983); Christian v. American Home Assurance Co.,
577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1978); Bibeault v. Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 313 (R.I. 1980).
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fending and settling claims. 14 Good faith and fair dealing re-
quire, for instance, that the insurer effect reasonable
settlements of claims within the policy limits when there is a
substantial likelihood of recovery in excess of those limits.'5
Such a duty is reflected in the company's premiums. 16  A
breach of the duty of good faith, as with the breach of any
duty, gives rise to a cause of action by the insured. 17
Furthermore, an insurer has the duty to indemnify the in-
sured. While the obligation to defend is a contractual issue,
the duty to indemnify depends heavily on the applicable law
in the underlying action giving rise to a claim under the pol-
icy. 8 The most significant difference between the two duties,
however, is that the duty to defend is broader than the duty to
indemnify.19
14. See Rocky Mountain Fire & Casualty Co. v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 452 F.2d 603
(9th Cir. 1971); Dumas v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 111 N.H. 43, 274 A.2d 781
(1971); Reisen v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 225 Va. 327, 302 S.E.2d 529 (1983).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has emphasized that the duty to exercise good faith
toward the insured in determining whether a settlement should be undertaken arises
from the insurance contract. Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W.
257, 235 N.W. 413 (1931); see Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 103 Wis.
2d 56, 307 N.W.2d 256 (1981); Alt v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 71 Wis. 2d 340,
237 N.W.2d 706 (1976).
15. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 429, 426 P.2d 173, 176, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13, 16 (1967); see St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. Martin, 190 F.2d 455 (10th Cir.
1951); Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 323 A.2d 495
(1974); Alt, 71 Wis. 2d 340, 237 N.W.2d 706.
Most standard liability policies contain "settlement" clauses stating that the com-
pany may settle a claim. The right to settle claims within policy limits is absolute, as
long as fraud is not involved. However, the company forfeits this right if it violates its
own obligations to settle and defend in good faith. See P. MAGARICK, supra note 5, at
129-30.
16. Peter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 1347, 1350 (C.D. Cal. 1974); accord
Centennial Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 62 Ohio St. 2d 221, _, 404 N.E.2d 759,
762 (1980); Estate of Penn v. Amalgamated Gen. Agencies, 148 N.J. Super. 419, 423-
24, 372 A.2d 1124, 1126-27 (1977).
17. See cases cited supra notes 11 & 14. If the insurer breaches its duty to settle in
good faith within the policy limits, the insured has a cause of action against the insurer
for the amount of judgment in excess of the policy limits. Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 430-31,
426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17; see Lange v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 290 Minn.
61, 185 N.W.2d 881 (1971).
18. See St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Three "D" Sales, Inc., 518 F. Supp.
305 (D.N.D. 1981); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Albert Pipe & Supply Co., 484 F.
Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
19. See, e.g., Sherman v. Ambassador Ins. Co., 670 F.2d 251, 258-59 (D.C. Cir.
1981); Maneikis v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 655 F.2d 818, 822 (7th Cir. 1981); Howard v.
Russell Stover Candies, Inc., 649 F.2d 620, 625 (8th Cir. 1981); St. Paul Fire & Marine
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II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INSURERS AND
THE INSURED
A. The Primary Insurer's Obligation to the Insured
The primary insurer's initial and perhaps sole duty is to
investigate, evaluate, defend and settle the insured's claim.2 °
Indeed, most primary policy language provides that the com-
pany controls the litigation and reserves the right to control
the selection of counsel and direction of the defense. These
features are especially evident where the amount claimed is
within the primary limits.2' Aside from paying the costs of
defense of an action, the primary insurer is also responsible for
indemnifying the insured for any recovery against the insured
up to the primary policy limits.
22
In exchange for the primary insurer's agreement to protect
the rights and liabilities of its insured, the primary collects a
premium contemplating the risk, investigatory expenses and
Ins. Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 603 F.2d 780, 786 (9th Cir. 1979); Donnelly v. Trans-
portation Ins. Co., 589 F.2d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 1978); United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co. v. Louis A. Roser Co., 585 F.2d 932, 936 (8th Cir. 1978); Fresno Economy Import
Used Cars, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 76 Cal. App. 3d 272, 278, 142
Cal. Rptr. 681, 685 (1977); ADA Resources, Inc. v. Don Chamblin & Assocs., 361 So.
2d 1339, 1342 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Sturges Mfg. Co. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 37 N.Y.2d
69, 72, 332 N.E.2d 319, 321 371 N.Y.S.2d 444, 447 (1975); Gross v. Lloyds of London
Ins. Co., 121 Wis. 2d 78, 86, 358 N.W.2d 266, 270 (1984).
Thus, the duty to defend often extends beyond the duty to indemnify. There may
even be an obligation to defend without an obligation to indemnify. See Oliver B. Can-
non & Son v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 484 F. Supp. 1375, 1385 (D. Del. 1980); Conway
v. Country Casualty Ins. Co., 92 Ill. 2d 388, -, 442 N.E.2d 245, 247 (1982). An in-
surer is not absolved from the duty to defend merely because it is forbidden by law, or
the insurance contract itself, to indemnify the liability-causing action. See Previews,
Inc. v. California Union Ins. Co. 640 F.2d 1026 (9th Cir. 1981); St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Weiner, 606 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1979); Sears, 603 F.2d 780; Val's Painting &
Drywall, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 53 Cal. App. 3d 576, 126 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1975).
20. Daniels v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 422 F.2d 87, 88 (4th Cir. 1970); Conti-
nental Casualty Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 516 F. Supp. 384, 387 (N.D.
Cal. 1981); Vencill v. Continental Casualty Co., 433 F. Supp. 1371, 1377-78 (S.D. W.
Va. 1977); Western World Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 150 N.J. Super. 481, 486-87, 376
A.2d 177, 180 (1977); see Griffin, Excess Liability Insurance, 62 MARQ. L. REv. 375,
383 (1978-79); Holloway & Hamm, Defenses to Excess Carrier's Suit Against a Primary
Insurer - Refusal to Defend or Settle, 11 FORUM 940, 945 (1975-76).
21. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, 56 Cal.
App. 3d 791, 129 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1976); Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Connecticut
Fire Ins. Co., 239 So. 2d 472 (La. Ct. App. 1970); 7C J. APPLEMAN, supra note 8,
§ 4691, at 274; Griffin, supra note 20, at 377, 388.
22. See generally Lanzone & Ringel, Duties of a Primary Insurer to an Excess In-
surer, 61 NEB. L. REv. 259 (1982).
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defense costs. z3 The premium reflects the payment of defense
attorneys' fees and expenses.2 4 Accordingly, a primary in-
surer "should undertake the defense at its own cost.., even
when its policy limit has been exhausted by partial settlement
or tender of its limits into court. 2 5
The obligations of the primary insurer cease after the lim-
its of its policy have been exhausted by payment of judgment
or settlement.2 6
[P]olicy limits are exhausted when an insurer pays its policy
limits in full or partial satisfaction of a judgment rendered
against its insured or pursuant to a complete settlement of a
claim against its insured. Thereafter, the insurer has no duty
to defend the insured in a separate action arising out of the
same occurrence or to represent the insured on appeal for
the judgment or to defend the insured in a co-defendant's
action for contribution or indemnification. z7
The primary insurer's duty to the insured may also be ter-
minated by tendering the policy limits into court and request-
ing exoneration.28 Other courts have maintained, however,
that the duty to defend is not terminated by such conduct be-
23. See Hardies, Guiding Principles (and Principals) in Primary and Excess
Problems, 1977 INS. L.J. 469, 472-73.
24. Aetna Casualty, 56 Cal. App. 3d at 805-07, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 56-57.
25. S. COZEN & D. DEY, RIGHTS AND DUTIEs OF PRIMARY AND ExcEss CARRI-
ERS - A NUTS AND BOLTS APPRAISAL 17 (Defense Research Institute Monograph
No. 1, 1984).
26. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Montgomery Trucking Co., 328 F. Supp. 415 (N.D. Ga.
1971); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, 231 F. Supp. 860 (S.D. Ind. 1964); Aetna
Casualty, 56 Cal. App. 3d 791, 129 Cal. Rptr. 47; Elas v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 39 Ill. App. 3d 944, 352 N.E.2d 60 (1976).
Several principles of law considering whether exhaustion of policy limits terminates
an insurer's duty to defend have developed. First, the nature and extent of the duty to
defend is a matter of contract to be determined by established principles of contract
interpretation. Second, any limitation on the duty must be clear and comprehensible to
the average insured. Finally, even if the duty has been terminated, the insurer is not
entitled to desert the insured. Van Vugt, Termination of the Insurer's Duty to Defend by
Exhaustion of Policy Limits, 44 INS. COUNS. J. 254, 255 (1977).
27. Van Vugt, supra note 26, at 263.
28. General Casualty Co. v. Whipple, 328 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1964); Adams, 231 F.
Supp. 860. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Gross v. Lloyds of London Ins. Co., 121
Wis. 2d 78, 358 N.W.2d 266 (1984), concluded that the insurer could be relieved of its
duty to defend upon tender of its policy limits only if language to that effect was con-
spicuously highlighted in the policy.
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cause it exists independent of the duty to pay, 29 even where
the insured has an excess policy.30 It appears then that the
primary insurer should be guided by the advice of counsel on
whether it has the right to tender its limits and shed its obliga-
tion of a continued defense thereunder.31 The insured's inter-
ests, however, may still demand the continued protection of
the primary insurer, despite only a threatened exhaustion of
the policy limits.3 2
The fact that the insured has a policy with an excess in-
surer should not alter the obligation of the primary insurer.33
The primary's decision whether to settle or to try a case must
be approached as if there were no policy limit applicable and
no excess insurer involved. The duty remains unchanged even
though it is possible that the excess carrier might be involved
in a verdict in excess of the primary policy limits. 34 Further-
more, though the interests of the excess company are greatly
29. See, e.g., Anchor Casualty Co. v. McCaleb, 178 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1949); Sim-
mons v. Jeffords, 260 F. Supp. 641 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Conway v. Country Casualty Ins.
Co., 92 Ill. 2d 388, 442 N.E.2d 245 (1982).
30. National Casualty Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 230 F. Supp. 617 (N.D.
Ohio 1964).
31. S. COZEN & D. DEY, supra note 25, at 21. One writer contends that in an
agreement where an insurer tenders its limits to a claimant in exchange for a partial
release of his claim against the insured, it is not in fact a "settlement" but merely a
credit against the insured's ultimate liability. Therefore, payment of the limits would
not terminate the duty to defend. Van Vugt, supra note 26, at 264. Under this analysis
it would be logical to conclude that not paying the full limits would not terminate the
duty to defend. See infra notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
32. See Landando v. Bluth, 292 F. Supp. 975 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Simmons, 260 F.
Supp. 641; National Casualty, 230 F. Supp. 617.
33. Peter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 1347, 1350 (C.D. Cal. 1974); see 7C J.
APPLEMAN, supra note 8, at 30, 32-33.
Any reduction in the duties of the primary carrier to accept reasonable settle-
ment offers due to the presence of excess coverage would have two detrimental
results. It would imperil "the public and judicial interests in fair and reasonable
settlement of lawsuits" by creating a disincentive for the primary insurer to set-
tle. It also would result in an unfair distribution of losses among insurers "by
thwarting the different kinds of coverages and rating structures if the excess car-
rier must cover both primary and excess liability."
P. Hix, W. KURLANDER & S. FARRUGGIA, ALLOCATION OF DEFENSE COSTS BE-
TWEEN PRIMARY AND EXCESS CARRIERS 53 (Defense Research Institute Monograph
No. 1, 1984).(citing Continental Casualty Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 307 Minn. 5, -, 238
N.W.2d 862, 864-65 (1976) (footnotes omitted)).
34. Continental Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d 281 (Alaska 1980); P.
MAGARICK, supra note 5, at 21.
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affected by the actions of the primary insurer,35 the fact that
the primary might be liable in some way to the excess does not
increase the overall duty or liability of the primary carrier.36
B. The Excess Insurer's Obligation to the Insured
While primary policies have a "duty to defend" clause, ex-
cess policies normally do not; however, if they do have one, it
is somewhat limited.37 The "duty to defend" clause usually
provides that it "follows form" to that of the primary clause
with the significant exceptions of premium, amount of cover-
age and duty of defense. 38 "The excess carrier usually does
not have the right to exercise control in the investigation and
legal handling, and is, to a large degree, much 'at the mercy'
of the primary's judgment (or lack thereof). 39 In sum, while
the primary insurer is responsible to indemnify and pay de-
fense costs, the excess is simply obligated to indemnify the in-
sured for amounts recovered in excess of the primary insurer's
policy limits.4°
Excess policies usually require that valid primary insur-
ance be maintained by the insured, otherwise the policy will
be deemed void.41 The underlying reason for this requirement
is that when no primary insurance is available, the excess car-
rier is exposed to a greater risk than it contemplated in its
policy. In addition, the excess insurer's premium does not re-
flect the primary coverage responsibility. 42 Courts may be re-
35. Peter, 375 F. Supp. at 1350.
36. See cases cited supra note 16.
37. For examples of typical defense clauses, see N. MANN, AN INTRODUCTION To
THE RELATIONSHIP OF PRIMARY AND EXCESS INSURERS 4 (Defense Research Institute
Monograph No. 1, 1984).
38. See German & Gallagher, Duties of Defense, supra note 5, at 244. But see Off-
shore Logistics Servs., Inc. v. Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 469 F. Supp. 1099
(E.D. La. 1979), modified, 639 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1981) (excess carrier found liable for
defense costs where policy covered all liability described in the primary policy).
This is not the situation in "coincidence" cases where there is a duty to defend
clause in each insurance policy. Normally, however, "other insurance" clauses in "co-
incidence" policies do not apply to defense costs. See Comment, supra note 5, at 374-
76, 378-79.
39. Hardies, supra note 23, at 473 (emphasis in original).
40. See Lanzone & Ringel, supra note 22.
41. See, e.g., Mid-Century Ins. Exch. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 98 Ill.
App. 3d 493, 424 N.E.2d 686 (1981).
42. P. MAGARICK, EXCESS LIABILrrY 152-53 (2d ed. Supp. 1986).
1987]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
luctant, however, to forfeit primary coverage in such a
situation.43
Taking into consideration the existence and underlying
limits of the primary policy, the excess policy is written at a
lower premium than that of the primary policy." The as-
sumption, of course, is that the excess carrier knows the iden-
tity and conditions of the underlying insurance.
The excess carrier for a much lesser premium, agrees to as-
sume the monetary liability of an insured beyond a "sum
certain" and to a maximum stated amount or limit - but
only after all sums for loss, handling expense, and legal have
been paid to the sum certain by the primary carrier.45
For the most part, merely comparing the premium paid for
the respective policies would indicate which of the two is the
excess policy.46
An important part of the primary policy as far as the ex-
cess insurer is concerned is the policy limits. These limits cre-
ate the need for the excess carrier, whose lower limit usually
begins where the primary carrier's maximum limit ends. The
unique feature of the excess policy is that it provides that the
excess insurer realizes no obligation to the insured until the
primary insurer has exhausted its policy limits.47 The excess
43. See, e.g., Vencill v. Continental Ins. Co., 433 F. Supp. 1371 (S.D. W. Va. 1977)
(primary policy construed in a manner to insure proper "fit" with the excess policy).
This rule is in contrast to "coincidence" cases where "other insurance" provisions are
written to cover the possibility that the insured might have other coverage available.
See German & Gallagher, Duties of Defense, supra note 5, at 244.
44. See, e.g., Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 404, 320 N.W.2d 175, 179 (1982).
45. Hardies, supra note 23, at 473 (emphasis in original).
46. See 16 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 62:46, at 483 (2d ed.
1983). Historically, premiums for excess carriers are significantly lower than premiums
for primary carriers. See infra note 164. For example, a review of the court of appeals
opinion and the briefs filed in Signal Cos. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 27 Cal. 3d 359, 362, 612
P.2d 889, 891, 165 Cal. Rptr. 799, 801 (1980), revealed that the primary insurer re-
ceived $106,000 in premiums for $25,000 in coverage, whereas the excess premium was
about $150,000 for $10,000,000 in coverage. See Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d
292, 296 (9th Cir. 1977); Continental Casualty Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 307 Minn. 5, -,
238 N.W.2d 862, 865 (1976); Gallagher & German, Settlement Conflicts, supra note 1,
at 349 & n.260.
47. See, e.g., Priester v. Vigilant Ins. Co. , 268 F. Supp. 156 (S.D. Iowa 1967);
Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 249 Cal. App. 2d 144, 57 Cal. Rptr.
240 (1967); New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Certain Underwriters at LLoyds, 34 Ill.
2d 424, 216 N.E.2d 665 (1966); Occidental Fire & Casualty Co. v. Underwriters at
Lloyd's, 19 Il. App. 3d 265, 311 N.E.2d 330 (1974); Reserve, 307 Minn. 5, 238 N.W.2d
862; Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 239 So. 2d 472 (La.
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carrier has no obligation to defend or contribute to a settle-
ment or judgment where the final loss figure, whether by judg-
ment or settlement, is within the primary coverage limit, even
where the amount claimed exceeds the primary limits.48
Where the amount claimed is within the primary limits, the
excess insurer can generally only defend where the primary
insurer refuses to do so.' If the excess insurer does provide
the initial defense for the insured, the excess has the right to
be reimbursed by the primary insurer.50 While the duty to
defend between multiple insurers is several and not joint, some
court decisions recognize an equal or coexisting duty to de-
fend on the part of the excess company.5 1
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRIMARY AND
ExcEss INSURERS
A. Privity of Contract
Although both the primary and excess carrier owe a direct
contractual duty to the insured, generally speaking there is no
privity of contract between the two insurers. 2 In American
Surety Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,5 3
the Minnesota Supreme Court decided that a primary insurer
was not entitled to recover attorneys' fees and expenses in-
Ct. App. 1970); 16 G. COUCH, supra note 46, § 62:48, at 487 n.8; P. MAGARICK, supra
note 5, at 256 n.23; German & Gallagher, Duties of Defense, supra note 5, at 244; Grif-
fin, supra note 20, at 377, 388.
48. See, e.g., Bettenburg v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 350 F. Supp. 873 (D.
Minn. 1972); American Sur. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 274 Minn. 81, 142
N.W.2d 304 (1966). There is a range of opinion as to which insurer is responsible for
the cost and conduct of the defense where the amount requested in the complaint is
within the primary limits. See generally Griffin, supra note 20, at 383-85.
49. Priester, 268 F. Supp. 156; Lumbermens, 239 So. 2d 472.
50. Zurich Ins. Co. v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 117 Ga. App. 426, 160
S.E.2d 803 (1968); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Marquette Casualty Co., 143 So. 2d 249
(La. Ct. App. 1962); Farmers Ins. Group v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., 84 Mich.
App. 474, 269 N.W.2d 647 (1978); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Foundation Re-
serve Ins. Co., 78 N.M. 359, 431 P.2d 737 (1967).
51. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, 56 Cal.
App. 3d 791, 801, 129 Cal. Rptr. 47, 53 (1976); Lujan v. Gonzales, 84 N.M. 229, -,
501 P.2d 673, 677-78 (1972).
52. See, eg., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 285 F.2d 579
(10th Cir. 1960); Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 27 Cal. 3d
912, 610 P.2d 1038, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1980); Josten's Inc. v. Mission Ins. Co., 354
N.W.2d 575 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
53. 274 Minn. 81, 142 N.W.2d 304 (1966).
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curred in its defense from the excess insurer because the ex-
cess had no contractual obligation to the primary to defend
the action.54 The Wisconsin Supreme Court similarly con-
cluded in Loy v. Bunderson 55 that the primary insurer had no
contractual duty running to the excess insurer. 6
Mutually imposed duties do not exist to a large extent sim-
ply because there is often an insufficient relationship between
the two insurers, particularly in the case of excess coverage
resulting from an "other insurance" clause.5 7 In addition:
[R]arely is the excess insurer not more sophisticated than the
insured and better able to look after its own interests. Thus,
it seems burdensome to impose upon the primary the same
duty of care towards the excess from whom it receives no
compensation as it has towards the innocent insured.58
Therefore, given the fact that there is no contractual obliga-
tion running between the two insurers, "[o]ne insurer has no
right of action against another insurer to recover the cost of
defending the insured."59
B. Notice to the Excess Insurer
Unfortunately, it is not altogether impossible for an excess
insurer to be unaware of the fact that its insured is involved in
a lawsuit in which the primary insurer has undertaken the de-
fense. The excess carrier might not even be notified of its im-
pending obligation until after a judgment or settlement has
been recovered against the insured in excess of the primary
limits. Then, upon notification, the excess is expected to con-
tribute its share to the insured based on its contract with the
insured.6
54. Id. at -, 142 N.W.2d at 306.
55. 107 Wis. 2d 400, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982).
56. Id. at 427-28, 320 N.W.2d at 190; see Teigen v. Jelco of Wis., Inc., 124 Wis. 2d
1, 10-11, 367 N.W.2d 806, 811 (1985). Excess insurance should be distinguished from
reinsurance at this point. While no direct contractual relationship between the rein-
surer and the person or entity insured under the direct insurer's policy exists, there is
such a relationship between the direct insurer and reinsurer. See A. ANDERSON, WIS-
CONSIN INSURANCE LAW § 5.4, at 161-62 (2d ed. 1986).
57. See Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 102 Ariz. 518,
433 P.2d 966 (1967).
58. Holloway & Hamm, supra note 20, at 944.
59. Josten's Inc. v. Mission Ins. Co., 354 N.W.2d 575, 577 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
60. See Lanzone & Ringel, supra note 22.
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Though the primary insurer is largely unaffected by the
existence of excess insurance in conducting its defense,61 the
primary ought to notify the excess of the impending action,
even though technically only the insured can call upon the
excess carrier for the performance of its duty to defend. 2 The
primary insurer owes a duty, in appropriate cases, to deter-
mine if excess insurance exists and to report the incident if
requested to do so by the insured, or have the insured report
the matter, to the excess carrier.63 The primary insurer
should "advise the excess carrier of tactical and strategic deci-
sions which it makes so that the excess carrier is put on notice
and has an opportunity to complain if it decides to do so.""
C. The Primary Insurer's Duty to the Excess Insurer
Strictly speaking, although primary and excess insurers
are not in privity with each other, the general rule now is that
a primary owes an excess the same good faith or due care duty
that it owes to its insured in the handling of a claim, its de-
fense and settlement.6 5 The manner in which this duty is im-
posed upon the primary insurer, however, is a subject of
debate.
61. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
62. 7C J. APPLEMAN, supra note 8, at 30.
63. P. MAGARICK, supra note 42, at 150-52.
64. S. COZEN & D. DEY, supra note 25, at 21; see also id. at 18-19 (for helpful
suggestions on what primary insurer should do about discovering existence of claim and
notifying excess insurer at preliminary investigative stage).
65. See, e.g., North River Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 600 F.2d 721
(8th Cir. 1979); Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 579 F.2d 514 (9th Cir.
1978); Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1977); Vencill v. Continental
Casualty Co., 433 F. Supp. 1371 (S.D. W. Va. 1977); Peter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 375 F.
Supp. 1347 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Group, 76
Cal. App. 3d 1031, 143 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1978); General Accident Fire & Life Assurance
Corp. v. American Casualty Co., 390 So. 2d 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Ranger Ins.
Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 389 So. 2d 272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Continental
Casualty Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 307 Minn. 5, 238 N.W.2d 862 (1976); Western World
Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 150 N.J. Super. 481, 376 A.2d 177 (1977); Estate of Penn v.
Amalgamated Gen. Agencies, 148 N.J. Super. 419, 372 A.2d 1124 (1977); Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co. v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 92 A.D.2d 337, 462 N.Y.S.2d 175
(1983); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 43
N.Y.2d 977, 375 N.E.2d 733, 404 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1978); Centennial Ins. Co. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 62 Ohio St. 2d 221, 404 N.E.2d 759 (1980).
Contra Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Dariyland Mut. Ins. Co., 102 Ariz. 518,
433 P.2d 966 (1967) (held that the primary carrier owes no duty whatsoever to the
excess insurer, but the language appeared to be dicta).
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1. Equitable Subrogation Theory
The principal means by which excess carriers have en-
forced actions against primary insurers is through the doctrine
of equitable subrogation.66 The excess carrier absorbs the loss
falling on the insured and becomes entitled to enforce
whatever rights the insured would have had against the pri-
mary insurer.67 The excess carrier reimbursing the insured
has an equitable right to be subrogated to the interests of the
insured against the primary, subject to any equitable defenses.
Technically the excess has no direct right of action against the
primary, but rather comes to "stand in the shoes" of the in-
sured. For this reason, the excess insurer is given the same
rights and duties as the insured against the primary insurer.68
Accordingly, the primary has a good faith duty to the ex-
cess to accept reasonable settlement offers within the limit of
its coverage.69 If a settlement falls within the primary's limits,
no excess coverage is needed, and the excess insurer cannot be
primarily or secondarily liable.71 If the primary refuses to set-
tle a claim within the limits of the primary policy, 71 the pri-
66. See, e.g., Blevins v. Commercial Standard Ins. Cos., 544 F.2d 967 (8th Cir.
1976); Vencill, 433 F. Supp. 1371; Peter, 375 F. Supp. 1347; Ranger, 389 So. 2d 272;
Gianinni v. Bluthart, 132 Ill. App. 2d 454, 270 N.E.2d 480 (1971); Farmers Ins. Group
v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., 84 Mich. App. 474, 269 N.W.2d 647 (1978); Reserve,
307 Minn. 5, 238 N.W.2d 862; Western World, 150 N.J. Super. 481, 376 A.2d 177;
Estate of Penn, 148 N.J. Super. 419, 372 A.2d 1124; St. Paul Fire & Marine, 43 N.Y.2d
977, 375 N.E.2d 733, 404 N.Y.S.2d 552.
67. Continental Casualty Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 516 F. Supp.
384 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Ranger, 389 So. 2d 272.
68. See Ranger, 389 So. 2d 272; Reserve, 307 Minn. 5, 238 N.W.2d 862; Estate of
Penn, 148 N.J. Super. 419, 372 A.2d 1124. Some courts, when imposing liability, place
heavy emphasis on the primary insurer acting in bad faith. See, e.g., Transport Ins. Co.
v. Michigan Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 340 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. Mich. 1972). Other courts
have in effect found the primary carrier strictly liable for rejecting settlement offers
within its policy limits. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d
173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
69. Valentine, 564 F.2d at 297-98; Continental, 516 F. Supp. at 387; Centennial, 62
Ohio St. 2d at -, 404 N.E.2d at 762.
70. See Canal Ins. Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 415 So. 2d 1295, 1299 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1982); Nortex Oil & Gas Corp. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 456 S.W.2d 489, 494 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1970).
71. See Priester v. Vigilant Ins. Co, 268 F. Supp. 156 (S.D. Iowa 1967); Lumber-
mens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 239 So. 2d 472 (La. Ct. App.
1970).
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mary may be responsible to the excess insurer for the amount
over and above the primary policy limits.7"
In utilizing the doctrine of equitable subrogation to redress
the prejudice caused to an excess carrier who cannot control
settlement negotiations, courts have understood the "disparity
between the position of the primary and excess insurers in the
management and control of litigation, in negotiation of settle-
ments, and in the respective premiums charged for each pol-
icy."' 73 In Continental Casualty Co. v. Reserve Insurance Co.,74
for instance, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that an ex-
cess carrier was subrogated to the insured's rights against the
primary carrier for breach of the primary's good faith duty to
settle. The court reasoned that the holding would encourage
settlements and prevent primary insurers from "imperil[ing]
the public and judicial interests in fair and reasonable settle-
ment[s] of lawsuits. ' 75 In addition, the court recognized the
fact that the premium rates of primary and excess carriers are
based on entirely different considerations, such that when the
primary insurer refuses to settle an action, the excess must
then make a reasonable settlement covering both the primary
insurer's obligations as well as its own.76
Subrogating the claim thus has the effect of maintaining
the essential purposes of the different coverages without
thwarting the rate structures of the two insurers. The Conti-
nental rationale has been accepted with approval in subse-
quent decisions.77
2. Direct Duty Approach
Although many decisions appear to rely on the subroga-
tion doctrine, language indicating a direct duty owed to the
72. See Valentine, 564 F.2d 292; Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins.
Group, 76 Cal. App. 3d 1031, 143 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1978); General Accident Fire & Life
Assurance Corp. v. American Casualty Co., 390 So. 2d 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980);
Centennial, 62 Ohio St. 2d 221, 404 N.E.2d 759.
73. Lanzone & Ringel, supra note 22, at 282.
74. 307 Minn. 5, 238 N.W.2d 862 (1976).
75. Id. at 9, 238 N.W.2d at 864-65.
76. Id. at 9, 238 N.W.2d at 865.
77. See, e.g., Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co. 564 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1977).
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excess insurer often permeates the rationale.7" For example,
Peter v. Travelers Insurance Co. 7 9 held that the primary in-
surer's breach of duty to its insured was actionable by the ex-
cess insurer by way of equitable subrogation.8 ° The District
Court for the Central District of California also stated, how-
ever, that based upon this theory "the duty owed an excess
insurer is identical to that owed the insured."8 " Technically
this "identical" element does not comply with equitable sub-
rogation principles. A similar contradiction in terms can be
found in the New Jersey Superior Court's reversal of a trial
court's denial of recovery to the excess carrier in Estate of
Penn v. Amalgamated General Agencies.82 After proposing
that it would follow Peter and other equitable subrogation
cases, 83 the court stated that "the primary carrier owes to the
excess carrier the same positive duty to take the initiative and
attempt to negotiate a settlement within its policy limit that it
owes to its assured." 84
Thus, another developing theory of liability involves a di-
rect and independent duty on the part of the primary carrier
to the excess carrier based upon their relationship in the
scheme of providing insurance coverage to the insured. 85 In
Puritan Insurance Co. v. Canadian Universal Insurance Co. ,86
for instance, a Pennsylvania federal court held that a primary
carrier owed a duty to the excess carrier which required it to
"refrain from acting in a manner which would unnecessarily
78. See generally S. CELENTANI & D. DEY, PRIMARY INSURER'S LIABILITY TO
ExcEss INSURER FOR FAILURE TO SETTLE WITHIN POLICY LIMITS 36-39 (Defense
Research Institute Monograph No. 1, 1984).
79. 375 F. Supp. 1347 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
80. The Peter court noted that there are several elements that comprise an insurer's
cause of action based upon equitable subrogation: (1) the insured has suffered a loss; (2)
the insurer has compensated the insured for the loss; (3) the insured has an existing
assignable cause of action; (4) the insurer has suffered damages; (5) justice requires that
the loss be shifted from the insurer; and (6) the insurer's damages are in a stated sum.
Id. at 1350.
81. Id.; accord Estate of Penn. v. Amalgamated Gen. Agencies, 148 N.J. Super.
419, -, 372 A.2d 1124, 1126-27 (1977).
82. 148 N.J. Super. 419, 372 A.2d 1124 (1977).
83. Id. at -, 372 A.2d at 1126-27.
84. Id. at -, 372 A.2d at 1127 (emphasis added).
85. See Peter, 375 F. Supp. 1347; Estate of Penn, 148 N.J. Super. 419, 372 A.2d
1124; Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 92 A.D.2d 337, 462
N.Y.S.2d 175 (1983).
86. 586 F. Supp. 84 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
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and unreasonably subject [the excess insurer] to a claim by an
injured party. '87
Nevertheless, despite this development, the direct duty ap-
proach to resolving conflicts between primary and excess in-
surers has not been widely accepted. 8 Wisconsin has also
been skeptical. In Loy v. Bunderson,8 9 an action was brought
against the insured, a primary insurer with a liability coverage
maximum of $50,000, and a "coincidental" excess insurer
with policy limits of $500,000. A release90 was executed in
which the claimant agreed, in consideration of $20,000 from
the primary insurer, to release all parties of any liability up to
$50,000. The claimant reserved his claim against the excess
insurer, however, for any amount between $50,000 and the
$500,000 policy limit. The insured was also released from any
liability in excess of $500,000. In addition, the claimant
agreed to indemnify, defend and hold the insured and primary
insurer harmless in the event of any claim by the excess
insurer.
One issue addressed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court was
the validity of the settlement agreement. 91 The court stated
that the fact of excess coverage in this situation was "a mere
87. Id. at 88.
In Pennsylvania it is fundamental that where there is danger of injury to person
or property of another, one is under a duty to use reasonable care to avoid the
occurrence of such injury.... Moreover, a duty to use reasonable care does not
arise only when one is in a privity relationship with another but rather, arises
when the wrongdoer could have anticipated and foreseen the likelihood of harm
to another or another's property.
Id. (citations omitted).
88. See, e.g., Vencill v. Continental Casualty Co., 433 F. Supp. 1371 (S.D. W. Va.
1977); Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 102 Ariz. 518, 433
P.2d 966 (1967).
89. 107 Wis. 2d 400, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982).
90. The release is now generally referred to as a "Loy Release/Covenant Not To
Sue." Teigen, 124 Wis. 2d at 4, 367 N.W.2d at 808.
91. The primary issue in Loy was whether the trial court had correctly determined
that the action for declaratory judgment involving the release was a justiciable issue
under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act. The court of appeals reversed solely on
the grounds that no justiciable controversy was presented to the court. Loy v. Bunder-
son, 101 Wis. 2d 215, 304 N.W.2d 140 (Ct. App. 1981). The Wisconsin Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeals, concluding that all the elements of justiciability were
present. 107 Wis. 2d at 407, 320 N.W.2d at 180. The court did not stop at that point,
however, but went on to address the excess insurer's contention that the provisions of
the release were erroneous as a matter of law.
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coincidence,""g and that therefore the excess insurer had a
contractual duty to defend from the beginning. As a result,
the agreement was not fundamentally unfair because the ex-
cess insurer's rights were not prejudiced.93 The court noted
that because no contract existed between the insurers, the tort
of bad faith could not arise between them on any theory.94
The most the primary insurer was obligated to do was protect
the excess insurer from any possible liability up to the pri-
mary's limit of $50,000. 95
The problem in comparing Loy with cases relying upon
the equitable subrogation doctrine is that in the other cases
the insureds were deemed liable for a specific amount, usually
greater than the primary limits. Thus, in these cases, the ex-
cess insurer had something to which it could subrogate its
claim. No such facts presented themselves in Loy, however.
Given the opportunity to expand the obligations owed to the
excess insurer by the primary insurer, the court in Loy de-
clined to follow a direct duty theory. 96
In 1985, the Wisconsin Supreme Court again reviewed the
issue of allocating defense obligations among primary and ex-
cess insurers in Teigen v. Jelco of Wisconsin, Inc. 97 The fact
pattern was basically the same as in Loy. The primary policy
provided coverage up to $500,000 and the excess policy up to
92. Loy, 107 Wis. 2d at 404, 320 N.W.2d at 179.
[T]his is not a situation in which a particular named insured purchased basic
coverage and then purchased additional coverage in excess of its primary con-
tract .... It is only because of the recital in [the excess] policy that its coverage
is claimed to be excess over the limits afforded by the [primary] policy. In the
absence of [the primary's] policy, [the excess] coverage would commence at 'dol-
lar-one.' It is clear, then, that [the excess insurer] is not a true excess carrier,
because the policy was not written under circumstances where rates were ascer-
tained after giving due consideration to known existing and underlying basic or
primary policies. Nothing in the record shows that [the employer] was in any
way benefitted [sic] in its premium structure by reason of the existence of [the
insured's primary] policy.
Id. at 404-05, 320 N.W.2d at 179.
93. In fact, the court stated that the excess insurer was "benefited by a fortuitous
coincidence." Id. at 418, 320 N.W.2d at 185.
94. Id. at 428, 320 N.W.2d at 190.
95. "All that remains is for [the excess insurer] to perform the obligation under its
own policy for which it has been paid a premium which it considered appropriate at the
time it made its contract with [its insured]." Id. at 429, 320 N.W.2d at 191.
96. See id. at 427-28, 320 N.W.2d at 190.
97. 124 Wis. 2d 1, 367 N.W.2d 806 (1985).
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$2,000,000 over and above the primary limits. The insured
and his primary carrier entered into a "Loy Release/Covenant
Not To Sue"98 whereby the primary carrier paid $390,000 to
release itself from all liability and to release the insured up to
$500,000. In addition, the insured was released from any lia-
bility over and above the excess policy limits. The claimant
reserved any claim it had against the excess carrier and any
recovery against the insured was to be credited in the amount
of $500,000. The court addressed the issue of whether the
trial court had correctly relied on Loy when it dismissed the
primary carrier from the action.99
The main difference between Teigen and Loy is that in
Teigen the excess carrier was in fact a "true" excess insurer."0 0
The court determined, however, that the distinction was insig-
nificant.101 "The desirability of Loy-type agreements lies in
the encouragement of partial settlements in future cases,
thereby fostering effective and expeditious resolution of law-
suits. Partial settlements not only benefit the parties involved,
but the justice system as a whole." 0 In addition, because the
insured was fully protected by the settlement, the court held
that the primary carrier had acted in good faith toward its
insured in settling the claim. However, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court again refused to extend this good faith settle-
ment duty to the excess carrier.10 3 The court reasoned that no
unfair burden was placed on the excess carrier because it was
asked to do no more than that for which it had contracted,
namely, to provide coverage in excess of that provided by the
primary carrer.'°4
D. Settlements Within Primary Policy Limits
Most authority considering the relationship between pri-
mary and excess insurers focuses upon the situation where a
98. See supra note 90.
99. Teigen, 124 Wis. 2d at 5, 367 N.W.2d at 808.
100. Id. at 7, 367 N.W.2d at 809; cf supra note 92 and accompanying text (for the
Loy situation).
101. Teigen, 124 Wis. 2d at 7, 367 N.W.2d at 809.
102. Id. at 7, 367 N.W.2d at 810; accord Swanigan v. State Farm Ins. Co., 99 Wis.
2d 179, 299 N.W.2d 234 (1980); Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106
(1963).
103. See Teigen, 124 Wis. 2d at 11, 367 N.W.2d at 811.
104. Id. at 11-12, 367 N.W.2d at 811-12.
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judgment or settlement is recovered against the insured over
and above the primary insurer's limits.'o5 Few cases have had
the opportunity to consider the situation in which the claim-
ant settles with the primary carrier for a sum within the pri-
mary limits and the excess carrier defends the insured in a
subsequent action. Of these cases, the outcome appears to
turn upon what the court considers to be "exhaustion" of the
policy limits. Given that excess insurance does not attach un-
til all primary insurance is exhausted, 10 6 it becomes critical to
determine the point at which "exhaustion" occurs.
1. "Exhaustion" as Not Constituting Settlement Within
Primary Limits
Under one theory, where the primary insurer settles with
the claimant for an amount within its limits, the settlement
does not constitute "exhaustion" of the limits. Therefore, the
excess insurer is not bound to defend or indemnify the insured
for the difference between the settlement figure and the pri-
mary limits. It is now settled in California, for instance, that
the primary carrier has the duty to defend up to its policy
limits and that the excess carrier, unless it voluntarily contrib-
utes, has no duty to do so before that time. In Hellman v.
Great American Insurance Co., 07 the primary carrier entered
into a settlement for less than its policy limits. The California
Court of Appeals stated that an excess insurer's1°8 liability
"does not arise until the limit of the primary insurer's cover-
age has been exhausted." 10 9 In this case, the excess insurer's
105. See, e.g., Bloom, Recovery Against Primary Insurer by Excess Carrier for Bad
Faith or Negligent Failure to Settle, 36 INS. COUNS. J. 235 (1969); Conley, Relations
Between Primary and Excess Insurance Carriers, 32 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 123 (1981-
82); Gallagher & German, Settlement Conflicts, supra note 1; German & Gallagher,
Duties of Defense, supra note 5; Griffin, supra note 20; Hardies, supra note 23; Holloway
& Hamm, supra note 20; Ingram, Triangular Reciprocity in the Duty to Settle Insurance
Claims, 13 PAC. L.J. 859 (1981-82); Lanzone, Primary Insurer's Duty to Excess Insurer,
1979 INS. L.J. 382; Lanzone & Ringel, supra note 22; Comment, supra note 5.
But see Ghiardi & Ferris, Excess Insurer Beware: The Primary Insurer has Found
the Back Door, FOR THE DEF., Feb. 1986, at 12.
106. See supra text accompanying note 47.
107. 66 Cal. App. 3d 298, 136 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1977).
108. The excess insurer's duties in Hellman arose as a result of the "other insur-
ance" clause in its policy.
109. Hellman, 66 Cal. App. 3d at 305, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
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obligation to defend did not arise because the maximum cov-
erage had not been exhausted.11 °
In Signal Cos. v. Harbor Insurance Co., 11 the California
Supreme Court held that a primary insurer had a continuing
obligation to defend, and that the excess carrier could not be
required to participate in the defense as soon as it was notified
of the claim where the primary policy was not exhausted. Sig-
nal is significant for two reasons. First, it distinguishes be-
tween "coincidental" and "true" excess insurers.' 12 Second,
the court delineates several reasons for finding that the pri-
mary insurer's limit must be exhausted: the language of the
"true" excess policy explicitly provided that its liability would
not attach until the primary coverage had been exhausted;' 1 3
the policy provided that the excess carrier must consent to the
extra costs, which it did not do in this action;11 4 the insured
was fully protected under the terms of the primary policy;' 15
and holding otherwise would be contrary to prior case law.'16
In Olympic Insurance Co. v. Employers Surplus Lines In-
surance Co.,"17 the California Court of Appeals held that lia-
bility does not attach to the excess carrier until all primary
insurance has been exhausted, even if the total amount of the
primary coverage exceeds the amount contemplated in the ex-
cess policy." 8 Excess coverage "is coverage whereby, under
the terms of the policy, liability attaches only after a predeter-
mined amount of primary coverage has been exhausted."' 19
In this way the excess carrier can greatly reduce the risk of
110. Id. at 307, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 29.
111. 27 Cal. 3d 359, 612 P.2d 889, 165 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1980).
112. Id. at 369, 612 P.2d at 895, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 805. Contra Teigen, 124 Wis. 2d
at 7, 367 N.W.2d at 809.
113. Signal, 27 Cal. 3d at 367, 612 P.2d at 894, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 804. The excess
policy in Signal provided that its coverage would not attach until either the primary
insurer had admitted liability or the insured had been adjudged liable and the full pri-
mary exposure had been paid and satisfied. Id. at 362, 612 P.2d at 891, 165 Cal. Rptr.
at 801.
114. Id. at 367, 612 P.2d at 894, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 367-68, 612 P.2d at 894, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
117. 126 Cal. App. 3d 593, 178 Cal. Rptr. 908 (1981).
118. Id. at 600, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 912; see Nabisco, Inc. v. Transport Indem. Co.,
143 Cal. App. 3d 832, 192 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1983).
119. Olympic, 126 Cal. App. 3d at 598, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
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loss which is reflected in its premiums.12 0 In addition, the
court noted that because the duty to defend and liability for
settlement arise simultaneously, where there is no duty to de-
fend there also cannot be any liability for defense costs. 12 1
Other jurisdictions have followed the California approach.
In United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Lay,122 a settlement
agreement required the primary insurer to pay $70,000 of its
$100,000 policy limit to the claimant. The settlement released
the primary insurer from further payment obligations, and the
primary insurer and the insured were given a "credit" of
$100,000, with any recovery in excess of the policy limit being
marked as satisfied within the available coverages. The claim-
ant later recovered a judgment against the insured, the pri-
mary insurer defending, for $150,000.
The Seventh Circuit held that under the language of the
excess policy,12 3 the excess carrier was liable only if and when
the insured sustained a loss exceeding its $100,000 retained
limit.124 Because the insured was released from any liability in
excess of $70,000, he could not sustain a loss greater than
$100,000, and therefore the excess carrier's obligation to the
insured never arose.12 5 The court further noted:
A settlement for less than the primary limit that imposed
liability on the excess carrier would remove the incentive of
the primary insurer to defend in good faith or to discharge
its duty ... to represent the interests of the excess carrier.
Here the primary insurer had no incentive whatsoever to
reach a settlement at a figure between $70,000 and
$100,000.126
Along the same lines, the Supreme Court of Oregon noted
in Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Truck Insurance Ex-
120. Id. at 598 n.2, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 910 n.2. Some of the policies in this case,
however, provided excess coverage only by way of "other insurance" clauses; therefore,
a premium rate comparison would not effectively apply to those insurers.
121. Id. at 601-02, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 912-13.
122. 577 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1978).
123. "The Company agrees to indemnify the insured for ultimate net loss in excess
of the retained limit . . . ." Id. at 422. The excess policy had a limit of liability of
$1,000,000 for each occurrence for a loss in excess of the primary limits. The "retained
limit" was therefore $100,000.
124. Id. at 423. The court termed the excess policy "a contract for indemnity
against liability." Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.; accord Estate of Penn, 148 N.J. Super. 419, 372 A.2d 1124.
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change 127 that carriers who have written excess policies do so
at premiums traditionally lower than primary policy premi-
ums. 128 For this reason, excess carriers should not be required
to cover risks on an equal basis with primary carriers. There-
fore, carriers which had written excess coverage "by design"
were not required to pay a pro rata portion of the loss until
the first layer of coverage was exhausted. 29
2. "Exhaustion" as Constituting Settlement Within
Primary Limits
Another line of cases requires an excess carrier to defend
the insured where the primary carrier settles out of the action
for an amount within its policy limits. For example, in Futch
v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 130 the plaintiff received a $6,000
settlement from a primary insurer having a $10,000 limit.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana disagreed with the excess in-
surer's contentions that its liability had not yet arisen and was
unavailable. The court reasoned that the release credited the
primary insurer with its total primary coverage of $10,000,
and that therefore the primary had released itself of all liabil-
ity. 13 1 A Louisiana appellate court was faced with a similar
issue in American Home Assurance Co. v. Commercial Union
Assurance Co. 132  A primary insurer with policy limits of
$300,000 settled for $214,000, the plaintiffs reserving their
right to continue their claim against the insured and the ex-
cess insurer for amounts over and above the primary limits.
The excess carrier subsequently settled the case for $62,500
and then attempted to recover that amount from the primary
insurer under the theories of equitable subrogation and unjust
enrichment. The court held that Futch controlled and denied
127. 245 Or. 30, 420 P.2d 66 (1966).
128. Id. at ._, 420 P.2d at 69.
129. Id. Some of the policies in this case, however, provided excess coverage "coin-
cidentally"; accordingly, the same reasoning would not apply.
130. 246 La. 688, 166 So. 2d 274 (1964). Futch involved a "coincidental" excess
insurer.
131. Id. at _, 166 So. 2d at 278. "The circumstance that Allstate [the primary
insurer] was able to settle its liability for $6,000 is of no consequence in determining the
responsibility of F & C [the excess insurer] for excess coverage." Id. at -, 166 So.2d at
278; see Benroth v. Continental Casualty Co., 132 F. Supp. 270 (W.D. La. 1955);
Wirick v. Wyble, 300 So. 2d 571 (La. Ct. App. 1974).
132. 379 So. 2d 757 (La. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980).
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recovery on the grounds that the excess carrier had settled for
its own liability only and not that of the primary insurer.
133
A primary insurer also settled out of a suit for an amount
less than its limits in Stargatt v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. 134
The excess insurer argued that it could not be found liable
because the clause in its policy stating, "'only when the pri-
mary policy.., has been exhausted,' should be read to mean
'only when the primary policy limits have been actually
paid.' ",135 The excess carrier contended that this interpreta-
tion constituted the plain meaning of the policy language.
The Federal District Court for the District of Delaware dis-
agreed, stating that the plain meaning of "exhausted" is "en-
tirely used up," and that the primary coverage had been
"entirely used up" by the settlement within its limits. 136
"[T]he defendant had no rational interest in whether the in-
sured collected the full amount of the primary policies, so
long as it was only called upon to pay such portion of the
loss as was in excess of the limits of those policies. To re-
quire an absolute collection of the primary insurance to its
full limits would in many, if not most, cases involve delay,
promote litigation, and prevent an adjustment of disputes
which is both convenient and commendable. A result harm-
ful to the insured, and of no rational advantage to the in-
surer, ought only to be reached when the terms of the
contract demand it.' 13
7
An excess policy provided coverage up to a $10,000 limit
under a standard "other insurance" clause in Deblon v.
133. Id. at 758.
This case leaves some unanswered questions. Unless the excess insurer
agreed to the conditional release, or unless it was impossible to get an agreement
to settle with a general release against all parties for an amount within the pri-
mary limits at the time of the original settlement by the primary insurer, the
decision could be a miscarriage of justice.
P. MAGARICK, supra note 5, at 252; see also Gasquet v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.,
391 So. 2d 466 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (where the court expressly refused to follow Lay,
577 F.2d 421, and allowed plaintiff to release primary insurer for less than full primary
limits, while granting credit for full primary limits and reserving right against excess
insurer).
134. 67 F.R.D. 689 (D. Del. 1975).
135. Id. at 690.
136. Id. at 690 n.3.
137. Id. at 691 (quoting Zeig v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 23 F.2d 665 (2d
Cir. 1928) (emphasis in original)).
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Beaton.138 The plaintiff executed a "covenant not to sue on
claim" in consideration of a $46,500 payment from the pri-
mary insurer, releasing the insured and primary insurer, but
reserving her rights against the excess insurer. The primary
policy had limits of $50,000. The Superior Court of New
Jersey upheld the validity of the covenant not to sue, reason-
ing that settlements ought to be encouraged and that from the
plaintiff's point of view it makes no difference who pays the
recovery. 139 The partial settlement did not prejudice the ex-
cess insurer. If anything, the excess carrier was benefited in
the sense that it was not exposed to any liability beyond its
policy limit by the terms of the settlement.14 In response to
the excess insurer's argument that such reasoning encourages
collusion between claimants and insureds, the court noted that
insurers could rely upon the "cooperation" clauses in their
policies. 141
Wisconsin follows these cases with regard to exhaustion of
policy limits. Loy v. Bunderson 142 held that by settling within
its policy limits, the primary insurer had discharged its duty
by satisfying the claim to the extent of its policy limits.
Hence, the primary had the right to be dismissed from further
liability. 143 Meanwhile, the excess insurer was required "to
continue with the defense for the potential liability re-
served." 1" The court in essence adopted the Deblon
rationale. 145
Similarly, the court in Teigen v. Jelco of Wisconsin, Inc. 146
determined that the primary carrier had satisfied all duties
owed to its insured when it settled for an amount within its
limits. The primary policy provided that the insurer would
have the right and duty to defend, but that it would not be
obligated " 'to defend any suit after the applicable limit of the
company's liability has been exhausted by payment of judg-
138. 103 N.J. Super. 345, 247 A.2d 172 (1968).
139. Id. at -, 247 A.2d at 175.
140. Id. at -, 247 A.2d at 176.
141. Id. at -, 247 A.2d at 176.
142. 107 Wis. 2d 400, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982).
143. Id. at 418, 320 N.W.2d at 185-86.
144. Id. at 418, 320 N.W.2d at 185. The "potential liability reserved" in Loy was
the liability falling between the primary policy limits and excess policy limits. Id.
145. Id. at 424-26, 320 N.W.2d at 188-89.
146. 124 Wis. 2d 1, 367 N.W.2d 806 (1985).
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ments or settlements.' "147 The court concluded that under
this language, the primary carrier had released itself and the
insured "just as if the full $500,000 policy limit had been paid
in settlement." 148 In other words, the primary carrier had ex-
hausted its liability by virtue of the "Loy Release/Covenant
Not To Sue."
IV. A PRACTICAL APPLICATION AFTER LoY AND TEIGEN
Several propositions can be gleaned from Loy v. Bunder-
son 149 and Teigen v. Jelco of Wisconsin, Inc. 150 to form a basis
for the present state of the law in Wisconsin on primary and
excess insurer relationships. As a way of illustration, consider
the following hypothetical situation:
X, a bus passenger, is injured as a result of the negligence
of B, a bus company. B 's primary insurer, P, provides cov-
erage up to $500,000. P's policy provides that it shall have
the right to defend any suit against B, but that it shall not be
obligated to defend any suit after the applicable limit of P's
liability has been exhausted by payment of judgments or set-
tlements. B 's excess insurer, E, provides coverage up to
$4,000,000 with a retained limit of $500,000.
X, B and P enter into a "Loy Release/Covenant Not To
Sue." In consideration of P's payment of $100,000, X re-
leases B up to $500,000 and for any amount in excess of
$4,000,000. In addition, P is released from all liability. Fur-
thermore, X reserves a claim against E up to E's limit, cred-
iting any recovery by the amount of P's limit.
Applying the Loy and Teigen principles151 to the above
fact pattern, P has satisfied its duty to defend and obligation of
good faith to B. P has exhausted its liability by virtue of the
release just as if the full $500,000 policy limit had been paid.
P owed no duty to E in the past, nor does P owe one now.
E, on the other hand, must provide a defense for B, should
X pursue a claim against B. If the actual amount recovered
against B is between $500,000 and $4,000,000, E will indem-
147. Id. at 8, 367 N.W.2d at 810 (quoting from the primary policy) (emphasis in
original).
148. Id. at 8, 367 N.W.2d at 810.
149. 107 Wis. 2d 400, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982).
150. 124 Wis. 2d 1, 367 N.W.2d 806 (1985).
151. See supra notes 89-104, 142-48 and accompanying text.
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nify B. If the amount recovered is less than $500,000, then X
cannot recover from any of these parties. If the amount is
over $4,000,000, X will not be able to collect any of the recov-
ery over and above the $4,000,000. Whatever the result, E has
no right to recover from P the defense costs that it incurs.
The question of whether E is a "true" or "coincidental"
excess insurer is unimportant. The Wisconsin courts' ration-
ale for upholding the release is based upon the notion that
settlements are encouraged and favored by the law. Public
interest requires that a plaintiff be permitted to settle claims
against some exposed parties without releasing others. Fur-
thermore, because none of the parties' rights are prejudiced,
the agreement is fundamentally fair.
V. CRITIQUE
A. Language of Insurance Policies
Policy language and controlling law determine the exist-
ence of relationships between insurers and the duties of each
to the other, as well as to the insured."5 2 Because the duty of
defense is contractual,15 3 insurance policies ought to be con-
strued accurately and given the effect their language clearly
commands. 154 In Occidental Fire & Casualty Co. v. Under-
writers at Lloyd's,155 for instance, an Illinois court emphasized
that an excess insurer's defense clause must be given its literal
meaning, such that the duty of defense will not shift to the
excess until all conditions precedent set forth in its policy are
met.156 To be sure, "courts must construe and enforce such
agreements as made and not make new contracts for the
parties."' 157
152. See, e.g., Western Pac. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 69 Wash. 2d 11, _., 416
P.2d 468, 471-72 (1966).
153. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
154. "No decision regarding the allocation of defense costs can be made in a spe-
cific case without first analyzing the policy provisions of the particular primary and
excess policies. A liability policy could appropriately disclaim any responsibility for
defense costs." P. Hix, W. KURLENDER & S. FARRUGGIA, supra note 37, at 52 (em-
phasis in original).
155. 19 Ill. App. 3d 265, 311 N.E.2d 330 (1974).
156. See German & Gallagher, Duties of Defense, supra note 5, at 255.
157. McPhee v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 57 Wis. 2d 669, 673, 205 N.W.2d
152, 155 (1973); see Bulman v. Bulman, 271 Wis. 286, 73 N.W.2d 599 (1955).
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Two sources of conflict often arise in cases allocating de-
fense costs between carriers. First, policy language may be
vague and ambiguous.158 Second, courts tend to reach incon-
sistent results "by varying their interpretations of the lan-
guage ... in order to reach results deemed desirable for
protection of the insured, to achieve some sort of 'fairness,' or
for public policy reasons."' 59 To combat these problems, in-
surers should convey their defense clauses in clear and unam-
biguous layperson's language. Furthermore, courts should
give defense clauses "a literal interpretation consistent with
their plain meaning." 160
B. Premiums
An insurer's obligation to defend does not continue indefi-
nitely "with total disregard for the amount of coverage
purchased, particularly if the insured had the opportunity to
buy higher limits for an additional premium." 161 The excess
carrier's duty to defend, however, does not arise haphazardly.
The premium paid to the primary insurer includes considera-
ble structuring to account for the fact that the primary carrier
will be undertaking the duty of investigation of the claim and
the defense of the litigation.162 Recognizing this fact, excess
insurers normally underwrite premiums on the basis of what
158. "This problem is particularly acute in coincidence cases, where the 'other in-
surance' clauses fail to adequately address which carrier shall have the duties of de-
fense." German & Gallagher, Duties of Defense, supra note 5, at 260. The application
of "other insurance" clauses "is still characterized by confusion, inconsistency and the
absence of rational guidelines for interpretation," despite longstanding industry aware-
ness of it and attempts to clear it up. Kahn, The "Other Insurance" Clause, 19 FORUM
591, 593 (1983-84).
159. German & Gallagher, Duties of Defense, supra note 5, at 260.
160. Id. at 261 (emphasis in original); see also McPhee, 57 Wis. 2d at 673, 205
N.W.2d at 155 ("Contracts of insurance rest upon and are controlled by the same prin-
ciples of law that are applicable to other contracts, and parties to an insurance contract
may provide such provisions as they deem proper as long as the contract does not con-
travene law or public policy.").
161. P. MAGARICK, supra note 5, at 11.
[T]he insured should not be left without a prompt and proper defense and if a
primary insurer fails to assume the defense, for any reason, the excess carrier still
has the obligation to provide a defense and, to do justice, should be entitled to
recoup its costs from the primary insurer.
7C J. APPLEMAN, supra note 8, at 33; see cases cited supra note 50 and accompanying
text.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
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the liability exposure for loss of payment would be. Moreover,
they consider the fact that information about the investigation
and defense will be obtained from the primary insurers. 163
For this reason, premiums for excess insurance are lower than
premiums for primary insurance. 1 4
The excess insurer's rate structure does not envision a rule
which permits another party to expand the excess insurer's
potential liability) 65 Loy v. Bunderson and Teigen v. Jelco of
Wisconsin, Inc., however, appear to dictate such a result. The
excess insurer is required to come in and cover the primary
insurer's contractual obligations as well as its own. An excess
insurer may be forced to raise premiums to afford the cost of
participating in the defense of the insured if the purposes of
the different kinds of coverage become distorted and uncer-
tain.166 The issue is further complicated by the fact that Loy
and Teigen failed to distinguish between "true" and "coinci-
dental" excess insurance. Though Loy indicated that an in-
surer must prove its rate structure to show that the insurer
obtained a different rate,167 Teigen ignored this factor even
though the "true" excess carrier could show that it had ob-
163. "The premium charged by the primary insurer supports more localized claims
adjustment facilities than those of the excess carrier." Lanzone, supra note 105, at 383;
see Peter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp 1347, 1350 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Transit Casu-
alty Co. v. Spink Corp., 94 Cal. App. 3d 124, 135, 156 Cal. Rptr. 360, 367 (1979); supra
text accompanying notes 44-46.
164. "The premium paid by the insured generally is computed by reference to the
risks being insured against; the more likely a specified 'risk,' the higher the premium."
Alleman, supra note 5, at 76; see supra note 46.
165. Valentine v. Aetnh Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292, 298 (9th Cir. 1977); Continental
Casualty Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 307 Minn. 5, _ 238 N.W.2d 862, 865 (1976); In-
gram, supra note 105, at 883.
166. Valentine, 564 F.2d at 297-98; Reserve, 307 Minn. at -, 238 N.W.2d at 864.
A rule dictating such a result would be both uneconomical and inequitable. Holloway
& Hamm, supra note 20, at 951-52; see Sutterfield, Relationships Between Excess and
Primary Insurors: The Excess Judgment Problem, 52 INs. COUNS. J. 638 (1985).
On the other hand, most excess insurance is written on a national basis. As a result,
cases deciding that an excess carrier will have to defend an action, the cost of which was
not originally contemplated in its premium, may not adversely affect the premium
structure of excess insurers to a great degree. Telephone interview with Bob Schmidt,
Underwriter at The American Companies, Inc. (Feb. 27, 1985).
167. "[The excess insurer] is not in fact an excess insurer which had the opportu-
nity, consciously, to adjust its premium rates on the basis that there was an underlying
policy purchased by the same insured." Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 417, 320
N.W.2d 175, 185 (1982); see supra note 95.
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tained a different rate based on the underlying policy.' 6  It
therefore appears that if an excess insurer does not intend to
provide investigatory and defense costs, the policy should
state so explicitly.
C. Nature of the Duty
An important distinction exists between the theories of eq-
uitable subrogation and direct duty owed to the excess carrier.
Under equitable subrogation, the rights of the subrogee (the
excess carrier) can never be greater than those of the subroger
(the insured). This fact can produce inequitable results. For
instance, if the primary insurer and insured have colluded to
improperly reject a settlement offer within the primary's lim-
its, the wrongful conduct by the insured would bar the excess
from recovering from the primary on an equitable subrogation
theory. If, on the other hand, a direct duty theory were imple-
mented, the insured's conduct would present no obstacle to
the excess carrier's cause of action against the primary
insurer. 169
The weakness in the equitable subrogation theory led the
California courts to adopt "triangular reciprocity" as a means
of allowing the excess carrier recovery.' 71 Under a "triangular
reciprocity" theory, the insured, the primary insurer and the
excess insurer occupy a three-way relationship which engen-
der reciprocal duties of care.'7 ' This three-way duty concept
is based upon the fundamental idea that reasonable foresee-
ability of harm creates a duty of care. Indeed, it only makes
sense that the excess carrier is a foreseeably injured party
168. The excess carrier in Teigen argued that Loy was inapplicable because the
insured's premium "was set and its policy was written based on the coverage afforded"
to the insured by the primary insurer, and that "the premium was calculated with the
expectation that the cost of defense of any claim would be borne by... the primary
carrier." Teigen v. Jelco of Wis., Inc., 124 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 367 N.W.2d 806, 809 (1985).
169. See Kaiser Found. Hosps. v. North Star Reinsurance Corp., 90 Cal. App. 3d
786, 153 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1979) (where collusion between the primary insurer and the
insured was not allowed to destroy the rights of the excess insurer).
170. See Transit Casualty Co. v. Spink Corp., 94 Cal. App. 3d 124, 156 Cal. Rptr.
360 (1979). Spink was disapproved on other grounds in Commercial Union Assurance
Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 912, 921, 610 P.2d 1038, 1043, 164 Cal. Rptr.
709, 714 (1980), but later approved in Signal Cos. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 27 Cal. 3d 359,
365, 612 P.2d 889, 892-93, 165 Cal. Rptr. 799, 802-03 (1980). See Russo v. Rochford,
123 Misc. 2d 55, _, 472 N.Y.S.2d 954, 959 (1984).
171. Spink, 94 Cal. App. 3d at 134, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
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when the primary carrier is negotiating a settlement. There-
fore, the excess carrier should have a direct cause of action in
tort against the primary carrier.1 72 If an insured has excess
coverage, the insured should not care if there is an excess
judgment. "Thus, it seems rather peculiar that the excess car-
rier's rights against the primary should arise by 'stepping into
the shoes' of the insured."1 73
Courts are often preoccupied with benefits to the insured,
in which case an equitable subrogation analysis may make
sense. Where the insured has suffered no harm, however, it is
illogical to speak in terms of the insured having a claim. By
adopting a direct duty analysis, courts can more easily con-
clude that a primary insurer owes the same standard of con-
duct to the excess insurer as it owes to the insured in the
absence of an excess policy.174 Several policy considerations
172. See, e.g., Holloway & Hamm, supra note 20, at 941, 951-52.
173. Ingram, supra note 105, at 872.
174. See generally Ingram, supra note 105, at 881-84; Lanzone & Ringel, supra note
22, at 282-83. One commentator contends that the direct duty theory will gain greater
acceptance when, and if, the "'Guiding Principles for Insurers of Primary and Excess
Coverages' find more adherence, since becoming party signatories to them might further
the development of a sufficient relationship between the parties to allow imposition of a
direct duty." N. MANN supra note 33; see P. MAGARICK, supra note 5, at 261; Sut-
terfield, supra note 166, at 642-43.
The Guiding Principles for Insurers of Primary and Excess Coverages provide:
(1) The primary insurer must discharge its duty of investigating promptly
and diligently, even those cases in which it is apparent that its policy limit may
be consumed.
(2) Liability must be assessed on the basis of all the relevant facts which a
diligent investigation can develop and in the light of applicable legal principles.
The assessment of liability must be reviewed periodically throughout the life of
the claim.
(3) Evaluation must be realistic and without regard to the policy limit.
(4) When, from evaluation of all aspects of a claim, settlement is indicated,
the primary insurer must proceed promptly to attempt a settlement, up to its
policy limit if necessary, negotiating seriously and with an open mind.
(5) If, at any time, it should reasonably appear that the insured may be ex-
posed beyond the primary limit, the primary insurer shall give prompt written
notice to the excess insurer, when known, stating the results of investigation and
negotiation and giving any other information deemed relevant to a determination
of the total exposure, and inviting the excess insurer to participate in a common
effort to dispose of the claim.
(6) Where the assessment of damages, considered alone, would reasonably
support payment of a demand within the primary policy limit, but the primary
insurer is unwilling to pay the demand because of its opinion that liability either
does not exist or is questionable and the primary insurer recognizes the possibil-
ity of a verdict in excess of its policy limit, it shall give notice of its position to
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should be noted in favor of finding a direct relationship be-
tween primary and excess carriers. Such a finding would: (1)
encourage settlements; (2) discourage gambling with the ex-
cess insurer's funds; (3) prevent uncecessary premium hikes
for excess insurers; (4) reduce the overall cost of claims; and
(5) reflect the duty of the primary carrier to perform that
which it alone has assumed, that is, to provide total coverage
within the primary policy limits.175
the excess insurer, when known. It shall also make available its file to the excess
insurer for examination, if requested.
(7) The primary insurer shall never seek a contribution to a settlement
within its policy limit from the excess insurer. It may, however, accept contribu-
tion to a settlement within its policy limit from the excess insurer when such
contribution is voluntarily offered.
(8) In the event of a judgment in excess of the primary policy limit, the pri-
mary insurer shall consult the excess insurer as to further procedure. If the pri-
mary insurer undertakes an appeal with the concurrence of the excess insurer,
the expense shall be shared by the primary and the excess insurer in such manner
as they may agree upon. In the absence of such an agreement, they shall share
the expense in the same proportions that their respective shares of the outstand-
ing judgment bear to the total amount of the judgment. If the primary insurer
should elect not to appeal, taking appropriate steps to pay or to guarantee pay-
ment of its policy limit, it shall not be liable for the expense of the appeal or
interest on the judgment from the time it gives notice to the excess insurer of its
election not to appeal and tenders it policy limit. The excess insurer may then
prosecute an appeal at its own expense, being liable also for interest accruing on
the entire judgment subsequent to the primary insurer's notice of its election not
to appeal. If the excess insurer does not agree to an appeal, it shall not be liable
to share the cost of any appeal prosecuted by the primary insurer.
(9) The excess insurer shall refrain from coercive or collusive conduct
designed to force a settlement. It shall never make formal demand upon a pri-
mary insurer that the latter settle a claim within its policy limit. In any subse-
quent proceeding between excess insurer and primary insurer, the failure of the
excess insurer to make formal demand that the claim be settled shall not be
considered as having any bearing on the excess insurer's claim against the pri-
mary insurer.
Guiding Principles for Insurers of Primary and Excess Coverages, CLAIMS EXECUTIVES
COUNCIL, AMERICAN INS. AWS'N & MUT. INS. ALLIANCE (1974) (cited in N. MANN,
supra note 33, at 8-9; Lanzone & Ringel, supra note 22, at 280-81).
According to some authors on the subject, however, the actual effectiveness of the
Guiding Principles is subject to dispute. Lanzone, Duties Owed by a Primary Insurer
and an Insured with a Self-Insured Retention to an Excess Insurer - An Update, 28
FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 267, 277-79 (1977-78) [hereinafter Lanzone, Update]; Lanzone &
Ringel, supra note 22, at 281-82.
175. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 285 F.2d 579
(10th Cir. 1960); Peter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 1347 (C.D. Cal. 1974); P.
MAGARICK, supra note 5, at 284; Griffin, supra note 20, at 382; Holloway & Hamm,
supra note 20, at 944-45; Ingram, supra note 105, at 881-84; Lanzone, supra note 105, at
400.
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D. Exhaustion of Policy Limits
Limits of liability provisions in excess policies specifically
provide that the carrier will indemnify the insured only after
the primary limits have been exhausted. 176 A workable defini-
tion of the word "exhaust" is to "use up" or "consume en-
tirely." 177 Under Loy and Teigen, exhaustion occurs when the
primary carrier satisfies its duty to the insured by tendering a
settlement amount that is within the primary's limits. 178 Such
reasoning violates the plain meaning of the policy language.
As a way of illustration, consider a person having a $200
pool of spending money available for a particular time period.
If at the end of that time period all of the money has been
spent, it can be said that the pool of money has been "ex-
hausted." If, however, at the end of the time period the per-
son has spent $150 of the $200, it would not be logical to say
that the pool has been "exhausted." Nevertheless, such is the
reasoning in those cases holding that a primary insurer ex-
hausts its coverage by paying only part of its maximum
limit. 1 7 9
In Teigen, the primary's policy provided that it would not
be obligated "'to defend any suit after the applicable limit of
the company's liability has been exhausted by payment of
judgments or settlements.' "1180 The court in essence concludes
that a settlement of any size exhausts a company's liability. It
is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of a primary insurer
"exhausting," "using up" or "consuming entirely" its liability
or policy limits when it pays to the insured an amount less
176. See cases cited supra note 47; see also Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d
292, 296 (9th Cir. 1977); Veneil v. Continental Casualty Co., 433 F. Supp. 1371, 1373
(S.D. W. Va. 1977); Signal Cos. V. Harbor Ins. Co., 27 Cal. 3d 359, 362, 612 P.2d 889,
891, 165 Cal. Rptr. 799, 801 (1980); McConnell v. Underwriters at Lloyds, 56 Cal. 2d
637, _, 365 P.2d 418, 424, 16 Cal. Rptr. 362, 368 (1961); Schweisthal v. Standard Mut.
Ins. Co., 48 Ill. App. 2d 226, 231, 198 N.E.2d 860, 862 (1964); Ryder Truck Lines, Inc.
v. Carolina Casualty Ins. Co., 270 Ind. 315, _, 385 N.E.2d 449, 452 (1979); Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co. v. Rairigh, 59 Md. App. 305, -, 475 A.2d 509, 518 (1984).
177. WEBSTER's NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 400 (1977). "Exhaust" is not
defined in the fifth edition of Black's Law Dictionary. Of course, the initial place to look
for definitions is in the policy itself, and if the policy contains a definition for the desired
word or phrase, then reference to outside sources is not necessary.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 142-48.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 130-48.
180. Teigen v. Jelco of Wis., Inc., 124 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 367 N.W.2d 806, 810 (1985)
(citing from the primary policy) (emphasis in original).
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than the policy limits. Certainly, a reasonable person in the
position of the insured would not have understood the word
"exhausted" to have such a meaning.""8
VI. CONCLUSION
Confrontations among primary and excess insurers are in-
creasing for various reasons: (1) significantly higher jury
awards involve excess insurance with greater frequency; (2)
most primary carriers' product liability policies contain an ag-
gregate limit which, once exhausted, triggers excess insurers'
coverages; and (3) primary insurers tend to gamble on the out-
come of trial whenever a proposed settlement would exhaust
the policy limits. The problem is that the gambled funds may
really be those of the excess insurer.18 2
Regardless of costs incurred by a primary insurer, an ex-
cess insurer has no responsibility unless and until the primary
limits have been exhausted. 1 3 From the excess insurer's per-
spective, an important benefit of an excess policy is the full
protection of the primary limits. Neither the insured nor the
insurers expect that the excess carrier will defend, settle or
satisfy claims which can be settled or defended for an amount
below the excess carrier's retention. This expectation is re-
flected in the premium structure,1 8 4 in the fact that excess pol-
icies specifically require that the insured maintain primary
insurance in specified amounts,185 and in the limits of liability
provisions of the excess policy.'8 6
To be sure, settlements like those in Loy and Teigen ought
to be encouraged among parties. However, one party should
not be allowed to impose a burden upon another where the
latter's obligation has not yet arisen. Any contrary result sim-
181. "An insurance policy must be construed in accordance with the test of what a
reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood the word to
mean." RTE Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 74 Wis. 2d 614, 624, 247 N.W.2d 171,
176 (1976); see McPhee v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 57 Wis. 2d 669, 676, 205
N.W.2d 152, 156-57 (1973).
182. See Lanzone, Update, supra note 174.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 47-51.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 161-68.
185. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 47-51.
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ply prejudices the rights of the excess insurer, namely, the
right to defend in accordance with the terms of its policy.
JAMES M. FREDERICKS
